KAREN REBELS IN BURMA
Sterling Seagrave
This
is the first of a three-part series on the insurgencies of Burma’s hill
tribes: the Karens, the Shans and the Kachins. Since 4 January 1948
when Burma gained independence from Britain and established the
coalition Union of Burma, the government has been unable to quell the
ethnic insurgencies. The Karen are the second largest ethnic group, next
to the Burmans, and constitute approximately seven percent of the
population. – The Ends.
When
the Burmese Army began its long-awaited move against the Karen Rebels
last June (Making strictly illegal use of U.S. helicopter in the
process), there was a lot of excitement on Embassy Row in neighboring
Thailand. A stunning Burman victory was predicted.
But
the prediction was wrong. By the time the attack ended, the U.S.
government had egg on its face and was trying hard to keep the details
from coming to the attention of Congress. Tow shiny new Hueys were lying
in the jungle like crumpled beer cans, and the Karen were grinning from
ear to ear. They had downed both Hueys with a homemade mortar. That’s
right, a home-made mortar.
It
happened this way. On 2 June 1983, the word went out among foreign
military attaches and journalists in Bangkok that a massive Burmese
operation had begun that day. The predicted outcome was practically
universal: This time it was all over for the Karens.
The
U.S. Embassy in Rangoon knew that the Hueys were involved, but made no
protest. On the face of it, this was highly illegal because the Hueys
were given to Burma's military dictatorship only for use in suppressing
opium traffic out of the notorious Golden Triangle, far to the north
where the borders of China Burma, Laos and Thailand come together. The
Burmans had given their word that the choppers would not be used for
population control. But everybody knew that they were using them anyway
to suppress the ethnic rebels.
There
had been arguments before congressional committees over the years,
pointing out that U.S. aid was being abused and used to destroy
political enemies of Burma's strongman, Gen. Ne Win. This was one reason
why the foreign embassies were watching the latest campaign so closely.
Another
reason was the dangerous proximity to the Thai border. The Thai
government maintains good relations with the Karen people and their
rebel leadership. It makes sense.
The
Karens are a well-educated, stable ethnic force with British-trained
military leaders. They are traditionally anti-communist and have been
struggling against Burmese oppression for nearly 40 years. The Karens
control the jungled mountains that serve as a buffer between Thailand
and Burma. They dominate an area larger than New England, including rich
countryside ranging all the way from the long southern tail of Burma up
to the bridge on the River Kwai, northwest of Bangkok, and northward
along the Salween River to the edge of the Golden Triangle, where the
wild and beautiful countryside comes under the control of a different
group of ethnic rebels, the Shans.
The
Thais obviously like having the Karen buffer zone. The rebels are
permitted to operate on the Thai side of the border with minimal
interference. On the other hand, Bangkok is traditionally frosty toward
Rangoon: They have been enemies for centuries. Burmese armies-mounted on
war elephants- sacked the Thai capital at Ayudhaya in the 18th century.
Still, despite pretenses of neighborliness, periodic skirmishes erupt
between Thai and Burman border patrols.
On
2 June, the Burmese Army struck first at a remote Karen outpost
guarding Nawtaya Pass at the top of the Dawna Mountain Range. This is
the only direct route through the mountains from the Burman-controlled
lowlands into a Karen stronghold in a broad valley along the Thai
border, near the town of Mea Sot.
The
Karens have controlled the big, secluded valley for decades,
successfully thwarting all Burman attempts to seize it. It is an
important part of the Karen rebel nation (which has its own prime
minister, cabinet, tax structure, school system, teak lumber mills,
etc.). But this time the small Karen garrison at Nawtaya Pass was
understaffed, reduced to only five soldiers. The rest were away on raids
against Burman garrisons to the west.
As
a result, the Burmese Army force was headed for the strategic town of
Mawpokey, where the chief Karen radio transmitter was situated. This
town, on the Burman side of the border river, has Karen schools and
mills, plus a hearty export trade to Thailand in cattle, teak and
minerals. It is close to Karen headquarters and symbolic of the Karens
success in running a rebel nation within a nation.
Units
of the Burmese Army's 44th Light Infantry Regiment had the town
surrounded before dawn on 5 June. One company managed to infiltrate the
town in the dark. When they were discovered, fighting began. There were
only 40 Karen soldiers in Mawpokey at the time, but as the attack
commenced, every able-bodied Karen in town ran for weapons. The Burmans
who had infiltrated were driven out. They regrouped, forded the river
and made their way through Thai territory to the Thai village of Mae Tan
to attack the Karen defenders from behind.
It
was a well-planned operation, supported by Hueys bringing in howitzers
and ammunition, and taking out wounded. The Karens realized that they
were in trouble.
The
first day's battle raged from 0530 until sundown. The Burmans lost 102
dead and 94 wounded. The Karen lost nine killed and 18 wounded. Although
taken off guard, the Karens reacted swiftly.
Main
force units and commando teams converged on Mawpoekey from every
direction. A battalion of the Karen's 7th Brigade, plus the 101 Special
Force who were rushing to relieve the siege of Mawpoekey, clashed with
Burmese Army elements at nearby Pwe Taw Roh, a battle that lasted two
days. Other battles occurred up and down the valley.
On
9 June, the Burmese Army seemed to have the upper hand when seven
rebels, led by young Saw Law Eh, slipped up to the enemy field
headquarters on the football grounds at Taleka. They were toting a
homemade mortar and five rounds of ammunition. While they struggled to
set up the crude mortar, they watched one Huey being loaded up and
prepared for takeoff, while another took on wounded.
When
the first Huey lifted off, Saw Law Eh began firing. His first round
seemed to go astray, and the first Huey was clattering off over the tree
tops when it suddenly exploded in midair. His second shot fell on the
football field and seemed to have been wasted. But shrapnel splinters
from it tore through the second Huey, which by then was about 20 feet
off the ground. The chopper dropped like a stone and sat on the field
with the rotors turning for about 10 minutes before the engine stopped.
There
was nothing visibly wrong with the Huey, but a Karen radioman in the
group heard the pilot say he felt pain over his bladder and the co-pilot
complain of chest pains. Shrapnel had hit them just enough to cause
panic and keep them from flying out. Both pilots seemed unable to move.
They had to instruct a soldier aboard how to stop the engine.
A
third mortar round meanwhile fell on the field, but did not explode.
The last two rounds were expended holding back the Burmese Army troops
charging Saw Law Eh's position. The Karens beat a quick retreat.
When
the Karens were gone, the Burmans blew up the Huey. Nothing was wrong
with it, but the only men who could fly it to safety were out of
commission for the season. The Burmans did not want to leave it for the
Karens. The rebels did capture several howitzers and a large quantity of
other weapons and ammunition.
The
Burmans were now showing definite signs of giving up. The loss of the
two U.S. helicopters had brought their confidence crashing down. They
called in jet fighters to cover their retreat. The Karens were now
organized and coming in full strength. Karen main force units were now
ready to take on the Burmans, one-on-one.
On
11 June, nine days after the battlelhad begun, two battalions of the
Karen main force engaged the Burmese Army at Taleka, killing 60 and
wounding 70 before the Burmans finally gave up and withdrew through
Nataya Pass. During the last skirmish, one of the Burman jet fighters, a
U.S.- made AT-33A, was damaged and tried to make it back to Pa-an
Airbase near the Salween delta, but it crashed short of the runway,
killing the pilot.
In
all, the Burmans lost 215 dead, 219 wounded, two Hueys, one jet
fighter, several artillery pieces and large quantities of smaller
weapons and ammo. The Karens lost a total of 18 dead and 26 wounded. The
Karens captured two French mining engineers- whom they were still
holding as this article went to press- for exchange. What had begun as a
major military campaign had turned into a disaster.
Diplomatic
relations between Thailand and Burma chilled to a record low for the
decade. The Thais are famous for their permissiveness and tolerance, but
this hospitality did not extend to Burmese Army troops crossing into
Thai territory for a sneak attack.
The
most embarrassing result, however, was the loss of the Hueys. If they
had been used successfully, neither the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon nor the
one in Bankok would have made a great issue out of their illicit use.
There is a good chance that it would all have remained buried in
classified cable traffic to the pentagon and State Department, with only
minor repercussions. Americans have learned that it is not fruitful to
try to slap the Burmans on the wrist. The Burmans are tough, independent
and highly intelligent, with one of the world's oldest and most
interesting cultures, and an impressive military tradition. They like to
do things their own way, even if it means angering Washington, Peking
or Moscow.
But
the fact that the two Hueys were destroyed while engaged in an illegal
operation (not to mention one involving penetration of the Thai border),
caused red faces all the way up to the Executive Office Building on
Pennsylvania Avenue. According to sources at the American Embassy in
Bangkok said the embassy staff was "whooping it up" with glee.
The
battle of Mawpokey was given lavish treatment in Bankok's
English-language and vernacular press. There were amusing stories
"warning" journalists "not to attend" Karen press conferences. The
stories, published at the instruction of the Thai government, made a
point of stating exactly where and when these press conferences would be
staged.
As
for Congress and the long-simmering issue of sending Hueys to Burma for
"opium suppression," there was an outside chance that this incident
would trigger a review of U.S. military aid abuses. But only an outside
chance. After all, who had ever heard of these Karen rebels, and who
could get excited about them when they were not called a national
liberation front?
The
United States should realize that the struggle for Burma never be
settled without the Karens' participation. They are the only rebel force
close and strong enough to hit the Burmans where it counts. This last
confrontation was not the first time they have proved it.
In
August 1948, just eight months after the Union of Burma became
independent from Britain, the Karens moved suddenly and swiftly to end
their quarrel with the Burmans. In less than 10 days, Karen forces swept
across the country, seizing the cities of Thaton and Moulmein without
firing a shot, and closed to within 10 miles of Rangoon. The Burmans
were stunned. Counterattacks failed to dislodge the Karens from the area
around the international airport.
Finally,
the Burmans used a ruse. They offered to hold peace talks under a truce
flag. The British ambassador and two other diplomats carried the offer
to the Karens and persuaded them to agree. Reluctantly, the Karen
leadership entered Rangoon under white flags, leaving their troops with
strict orders not to violate the truce.
In
their absence, Burmese Army units raced forward to gain strategic
battle positions. The Karen soldiers watched in fury, their orders
preventing them from blocking this betrayal.
In
the city, the Karen leaders were prepared to negotiate a peaceful
settlement. But they were astounded to be greeted instead by Burmese
demands to lay down their arms. Now that the Burans had treacherously
gained the upper hand, they wanted nothing short of total, unconditional
Karen surrender.
The
Karens had no choice. Their leaders were trapped in Rangoon. Their
soldiers were without senior officers- surrounded, outgunned and
outnumbered.
After
staging one of the most stunning military campaigns of the postwar
years, the Karens had allowed themselves to be duped. Their cause
collapsed as quickly as it had sprung into motion. The bewildered Karen
forces straggled back into he hills that divide Burma and Thailand,
where they continue their uneven struggle today, more than three decades
later.
Why were these tough, determined guerrilla forces tricked so easily?
And why does their cause remain tragically unfulfilled today?
The
truth is simply that the Karens are straight arrows, unable to
comprehend the duplicity of the Burmans. The Americans and British
always liked the Karens because of their basic honesty- or naivety.
And herein lies the pathos of their historic struggle.
The
Burmans, on the other hand, take pride in being able to get around
life's obstacles by cleverness, cunning or brute force, as displayed so
beautifully by George Orwell in Burmese Days. They are charming, witty,
artistic, handsome, lazy, full of music and laughter- and homicidal
tendencies.
In
Rangoon, hit-and –run drivers are often murdered by angry bystanders.
In the countryside, young men don't think twice about ambushing and
raping village girls if they catch them off guard. Rape, after all, is
just a strenuous form of seduction; and if the girl is a Karen, that's
even better since Karens are not Buddhist, but rather Christian "eaters
of foreign religion."
Few
things are as amusing to Burmans as a tale of outwitting or making
fools of the mountain people. It does not matter whether the victim is
Shan, Kachin, Karen, Mon, Arakanese, or from one of Burma's many smaller
ethnic groups. The Burman always sees himself as the fox in a sort of
Aesop's fable.
The
Karens came down into Burma thousands of years ago, in one of the
Mongols' periodic migrations. Their lore speaks of crossing the Gobi
Desert from the windswept steppes and forested taiga of Central Asia.
They still possess relics of their ancient script, a written language
that nobody in living memory has deciphered.
The
Karens settled in the fertile lower valleys of Burma, gradually
drifting south to mingle with the Mon people in the area that now
includes the Malay Peninsula and the southern tails of Burma and
Thailand.
Burma's
geography has ensured its survival over the centuries. Rugged mountain
ranges run north and south, blocking conquest from India or China. Rich
river-fed valleys lie between the mountains. The rivers run down from
Tibet, and include the Irrawaddy and the Salween, two of the world's
great rivers.
More
than a thousand years ago, the Burmans swept down in a migration from
the Himalayas. They are not Mongols, but rather Tibetans, heavily
influenced by the Hindus of India.
The
Burmans pressed south and gradually took over the soft pockets of rich
farmland in the lower plains of Burma, replacing the ancient kingdoms
and pushing the Karens and Mons up into the jungles toward Thailand.
There, the Karens became an oppressed minority, preyed upon for
centuries by Burmese armies mounted on elephants.
The
tide was turned when Britain came East in search of empire. From India,
The British invaded lower Burma in the early 1800s and waged a series
of Anglo Burmese wars to dominate the entire country. The Burmese
monarchy was terminated in humility.
Shrewd
English colonial administrators placed the civil service in the hands
of Indian carpetbaggers, who could be trusted to be servile, The
colonial army's native troop units were composed not of Burmans but of
Karens. It was typical of the British to administer a colony in this
way. They recognized the Karens as fundamentally simple people, not
given to mischief.
American
Baptist missionaries, who arrived along with the first British invaders
( my ancestors included), also recognized kindred spirits and took fast
to the Karens. Missionary schools and churches sprang up like
mushrooms, and the Karens eagerly accepted fundamentalist Christianity.
Although
the Burmese resented foreign domination, the Karens were accustomed to
it. To the Karens, the ruler's character was important – not his
nationality. The British treated them fairly and rewarded their hard
work and loyalty.
On
the other hand, the Burmans had been brutal overlords, stifling the
Karens and jealously excluding them from educations or government
participation. So the Karens were more than willing to help the British
administer Burma, and enjoyed their protection. Karen officers were
trained at Sand Hurst and gained significant mid-level ranks in the
British forces.
On
the eve of World War II, the Japanese secret service took advantage of
Burma’s internal situation to turn the tables on Britain. Spies arriving
as crewmen on Japanese ships offered help and training to Burmese
nationalists. Thirty Burmese “comrades were smuggled out in freighter
bilges for military training and political indoctrination in Japan,
Formosa and Hainan. When Singapore had fallen and the Japanese were
massed in Siam (the official name of Thailand before 1939 and from 1945
to 1949), their overland invasion of Burma in 1941 was spearheaded by
the Thirty Comrades, leading an army of Burmese rabble.
Unfortunately,
the Karens were in the path of the invaders. First the so-called “Burma
Independence Army” and then the Japanese Imperia; “Army had to cross
through the Karen heartland to from Bangkok to Rangoon. Anybody who got n
the way was cut down.
Murder,
rape, pillage and arson swept through the hills as the Burmans revenged
themselves upon the Karens. The physical atrocities were imaginative
and extreme: Ears and breasts were sliced off, genitals were skewered,
and women were impaled. The Burmese cutthroats who composed the invasion
spearhead were mostly criminals, smugglers, dope runners and riffraff
who had fled to Bangkok to escape the British constabulary.
The
poorly prepared British in Burma, as in Singapore, were badly routed.
Only the appearance of William Slim, a British officer, saved them from
ignominious defeat. Slim staged a fighting withdrawal to India that
remains one of the great moments of World War II.
In
India Slim rallied his forces, counterattacked in the Chin and Naga
Hills. And caught the Japanese overextended. The carnage ended with the
British in command and the Japanese fleeing back in to central Burma. (
Slim’s Defeat Into Victory id a brilliant account of the campaign.)
The
Burmese, recognizing the writing on the wall, contacted Lord Louis
Mountbatten, the supreme Allied commander for the China-Burma-India
Theater, and offered to collaborate against Japan – in return for
guarantees of independence after the war. The British reluctantly
agreed.
During
the three years of Japanese occupation, the Karens had been totally
subjugated. But hope reappeared in the form of Force 136 the British
commando operation staged from Kandy, Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in
1948). This infusion of British support gave the Karens heart, and they
wreaked havoc on the Japanese in ambushes and sapper operations up and
down Burma’s spiny tail. This was the region of the Bridge on the River
Kwai – part of a Japanese railway from Bangkok to Rangoon that was
repeatedly cut by Karen sappers. The famous bridge site can still be
visited easily from Bangkok, and there is a strong Karen rebel base
nearby at three Pagodas Pass.
War’s
end brought demands on Britain to grant independence to Burma as
promised. By then Britain had a labour government that was quick to
compromise. England had its hands full with internal rebuilding, and no
resources left to fend off independence movements in its colonies.
The
Burmese leader, Gen. Aung San who had led the Thirty comrades from the
beginning, was a tough, determined liberator. He kept pressure on
Britain until resistance collapsed in Whitehall.
Britain
recognized that independence could not be granted to the Burmas without
also granting it to the other ethnic people of Burma. Otherwise, they
would simply be turning over rule to one faction, while the others were
left to fend for themselves. The Shans already had a state government of
their own, so they felt no immediate pressure to escape from Burmese
clutches. The Kachins in the far north were so far away that they had
little contact with the lower Burmans. So they did not demand a separate
settlement either.
The
Karens had no separate state government, and if Burma were turned over
to the lower Burmans, it was clear to the Karens what would follow. They
initially pressed the British not to leave. Then they asked for
guarantees of internal self-rule. The best that Britain could offer was a
plan that gave the Burmans control of the central government, and made
vague promises to the Karnes and other ethnic minorities. They were
assured that they could sue for divorce after 10 years if the Burmans
did not treat them fairly. Theoretically, they could then become
independent or establish a federation on equal footing with the Burmans.
Unfortunately, the karens and other minorities believed these promises.
Burma became fully independent of Britain in January 1948.
Tragedy
followed, whether the Burmese leader, Aung San, Ever intended to live
up to his promises became a moot point when arrival politician had him
assassinated. Almost the entire independence cabinet died in the same
hail of machine-gun fire.
U
Nu, a Buddhist teacher, became the new Burmese leader. But he was
indecisive and vulnerable to pressure from unscrupulous generals and
politicians. the Communist Party took advantage of the chaos, and staged
a widespread uprising. Only a few months after gaining its
independence, Burma was plunged into civil war.
At
first, the Karens thought they should support the central government.
The Burmese Army had many Karen officers, and the defense ministry was
filled with Karen generals.
But
the Burmese were nervous. Now that they had gained power over all of
Burma for the first time in 150 years, they did not want to risk losing
it to the communists or to any minority group that mighty take
advantage. Craftily, the Burmans in the general staff engineered the
firing of a score of top Karen officers, purging the defense ministry of
Karens.
Burmese
newspapers, controlled by politicians, fanned the frenzy against the
Karens. Karen property was seized on trumped-up charges, and Karen
villagers and shopkeepers were arrested and beaten, while their home and
shops were looted. In the field, Burmese military units went berserk
and massacred many Karen families, who were in church observing the
Christmas Eve religious service. The Karens reacted to this brutality by
launching their successful 10-day blitz across Burma. Then the made
their fatal mistake of trusting the Burmese offer of truce talks.
A
fascinating aside to the Karen liberation efforts was the attempt by
British secret agents to persuade the Karens to secede from Burma and
set up an independent state called Kawthoolei. Although a labour
government was in power in the United Kingdom, the British secret
service and defense establishment were still the provinces of
Conservatives. The loss of Burma by the Labour government galled these
traditionalists, who were determined to regain a portion of what was
lost.
According
to the British plan, Kawthoolei would encompass the southern tail of
Burma, all the way up to Moulmein and the Salween River estuary. The
western boundary of the new state would be the Sittang River, just east
of Rangoon; it then would range north to include both the Salween
District and Karenni.
This
proposal would give the Karens and the Mons (who have always coexisted
peacefully) a significant independent nation, with its capital at
Moulmein, Burma's third-largest city and second-largest seaport after
Rangoon. Britain would immediately recognize the independent state, and
provide it a lifeline by sea with her merchant navy and gunboats.
It
was a workable idea. The new state would be roughly the size of Panama.
It would answer the urgent need of the Karens and Mon, and give Britain
a foothold again for trade and transit in the East.
Unfortunately,
the Burmese got wind of the plot (which helps explain their
pathological fear of the Karens at the time), and the British were not
especially effective in carrying it out- partly because the plot was
never approved by the Labour government. For example, the British
Special Operations Executive was to land arms and ammunition at Rangoon
airport to support the Karen forces fighting around the city. But the
British got cold feet at the last minute when their military mission
decided the the Karens could not hold out more than 10 days. The British
arms shipment failed to show, but the Karens fought on for 112 days,
until their betrayal.
Licking
their wounds after the Burmese treachery, the Karens did not give up.
Soon they had trained 10,000 soldiers and 10,000 paramilitary troops.
Karen military strength is roughly equivalent to that today, 30 years
later.
The
Karen forces are organized on a command chain extending from supreme
headquarters to command headquarters, divisions, brigades, battalions,
companies, platoons and sections. The Karen military chief, Maj. Gen. Bo
Mya, is a tough, experienced field commander.
The
Karen civilian government is a parallel organization with Prime
Minister Than Aung at the helm, and a central committee of able Karen
elders, including ministers of finance, justice, education, mining,
health and welfare. The annual budget of the Karen state, or Kawthoolei,
is about $2 million U.S., although this is an operating budget and does
not represent the total revenue by any means.
They
area controlled by the Karens is nearly as large as the
British-proposed state. The cities and large towns are still garrisoned
by Burmese Army units, but this area is still primarily a Karen and Mon
stronghold. The Burmese Army does not operate outside the garrisoned
towns without risking ambush and occasional massacre.
Out
of their stronghold, the Karens and their Mon allies export tin,
antimony and other minerals, and large quantities of Burma teak- all on
an industrial scale. Traders move large quantities of Burma gems,
including the world's finest rubies and sapphires, to markets in
Thailand.
Reciprocally,
traders take into Burma large quantities of dry goods, medicines and
commodities to be sold on Burma's nationwide black market. In a
socialist economy that resembles Bulgaria's at its worst, Burma has
little to sell in state stores, so most residents depend entirely on the
black market for food and goods.
From
1962 until 1982, when he stepped down in favor of his hand-picked
successor, U San Yu, Gen. Ne Win ruled Burma as a military dictator. He
is a frog-like man, with a lizard's grin, who has been known to beat to
death aides or colleagues who crossed him at the wrong moment. He once
became angry when an American Embassy car was blocking the entrance to a
charity ball in Rangoon. The acting American ambassador was causing the
delay as he stood by the car gibing instructions to his chauffeur. Ne
Win jumped out of his car and gave the American ambassador a mighty,
bone-crunching kick in the pants.
Nearly crippled by the kick, the humiliated U.S. diplomat was rushed home to the States and soon retired.
For
years, the Karens have managed to retain majority control of their
section of Burma, but they have not been able to gain total control. One
reason is the sheer size of the Burmese Army which, at 200,000 men,
keeps a sizable force in the center of the country to protect Rangoon,
Mandaly and Moulmein, Its three largest cities.
Other
large forces are spread along the Sittang front, facing the Karens. The
rest of the Burmese Army is on picket duty in the Shan and Kachin
regions to the northeast and for north, or directly engaging Shan and
Kachin rebel armies in running combat.
Thanks
to years of training and experience in this protracted, brutal civil
war, the Burmese Army has become extremely proficient. It has performed
well against crack units of China's People's Liberation Army during
Chinese forays along their common frontier.
The
Karens have proven to be just as skillful, but they have neither an air
force nor adequate air defenses. Consequently, the tiny Burmese Air
Force has been able to win many battles by using napalm and rockets.
If
the Karens were to cut off the tail of Burma at any of the many narrow
points south of Moumein (which could be done easily at any time), they
would have to contend with Burmese jets. The Burmese Army would use
their planes to chew up the Karen line, and then move in with supporting
armor.
To
correct this deficiency, the Karens must either develop and
antiaircraft capability with surface-to-air missiles and ground fire, or
cripple the Burmese planes on the ground with sappers.
The
Karens have been reluctant to strike deep within Rangoon, or ambush the
air force because they do not approve of treachery, and refuse to
practice it themselves.
Nevertheless,
changes are taking place. On 30 September 1982, heavily armed Karen
sappers attacked Rangoon's main radio transmitter and a nearby police
station. Rocket launchers and Chinese A K-47s were used in the attack;
the Kalashnikovs were purchased on the black market in Thailand. This
may signal a quickening in the tempo of this long civil war.
Indeed,
at Karen headquarters near the Thai border, delegations from the Shan
rebel forces, the Kachins and other ethnic groups have discussed forming
a joint military command. Proposed is a plan that would attach Karen
advisers to all other ethnic forces' headquarters to coordinate
operations. Units of tough mountain guerrillas from the Kachin and Shan
regions (including the Wa, Lahu and other hill tribes) would join the
Karen operations in the south, targeted on Rangoon.
The
objective should not be considered as a contest between communist and
non-communist elements in Burma. That struggle exists, too, but the
ethnic rebels are struggling for statehood, not political ideology. They
want a significant say in their affairs, control of their finances
without Burmese interference and a measure of self-rule under a federal
form of government.
Since
the Karens have suffered brutality for decades under a military
dictator as ruthless as Idi Amin or Papa Doc Duvalier (who despite his
retirement, failing health and age still retains power in Burma), they
deserve all the help they can get. The good people who gave sanctuary to
Lord Jim are still there, getting trashed by fate